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I. INTRODUCTION
The Climate Summit in Copenhagen was another attempt by world powers to
control the overwhelming problems concerning climate change. Commentators'
opinions vastly differed as to the success of the summit, with some claiming
failure and others claiming a great victory.' One commentator described the city
of Copenhagen during the Climate Summit as a "crime scene [], with the guilty
men and women fleeing to the airport."2
While the European Union came to the summit with the goal of drastically
decreasing emissions to thirty percent below 1990 levels, an additional ten
percent below the Kyoto Protocol requirements, the United States offered a mere
four percent emissions decrease from 1990 levels.! Several commentators believe
the failure of the summit was due to President Obama's refusal to sign the Kyoto
Protocol or his unwillingness to decrease emissions below a four percent cut.4
These two factors, combined with President Obama leaving the city before the
final vote, gave commentators plenty to discuss.' However, critics should also
consider the implications of the European Union's overly ambitious goal of
decreasing emissions by thirty percent.6
Member States of the European Union are already having difficulties
meeting the requirements set forth in the Kyoto Protocol and the European
Union's Emissions Trading Scheme.' The difficulties surrounding compliance
with the Kyoto Protocol are so burdensome that they have led some
commentators to question the meaning and benefits of accession to the European
Union.' Poland, for example, estimates that it will need to purchase emission
allowances by 2013 in order to meet the emissions obligations of the European
Union Emission's Trading Scheme.9 Poland's alternative to buying allowances is
to purchase natural gas from Russia, a cleaner energy source that could help
1. Leigh Phillips, EU Carbon Prices Fall Following Copenhagen Flop, EUOBSERVER.COM, Dec. 12,
2009, http://euobserver.com/9/29191; Darren Samueloshn, Obama Negotiates 'Copenhagen Accord' With
Senate Climate Fight in Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/
2009/12/21/21climatewire-obama-negotiates-copenhagen-accord-with-senat-6121.html.
2. John Vidal, Allegra Stratton & Suzanne Goldenberg, Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen
Ends in Failure, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 19, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironment/
2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal.
3. Phillips, supra note 1; Vidal, supra note 2.
4. Vidal, supra note 2 (commentators believed that the summit was a failure because "the so-called
Copenhagen accord 'recognises' the scientific case for keeping temperature rises to no more than 2C but does
not contain commitments to emissions reductions to achieve that goal.").
5. Id.
6. Phillips, supra note 1.
7. UNFCCC, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990-2007, U.N. Doc. FCCC/
SBI/2009/12 (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sbi/eng/12.pdf.
8. CARBON TRUST, EU ETS PHASE II ALLOCATION: IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS 11 (2007), available at
http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/Publications/pages/publicationdetail.aspx?id-CTC715.
9. Jan Cienski & Joshua Chaffin, Uphill Struggle for Coal-Fired Poland, FIN. TIMEs (U.K.), Oct. 30,
2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c47e7d6e-a6eb- 1 ldd-95be-000077b07658.html?nclick _check= 1.
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reduce Poland's emission levels;'o however, Russia's natural gas supply is not
very reliable."
Poland's inability to rely on a natural gas supply, and its fear of purchasing
emission allowances in the future, forced it to submit a national allocation plan
that projected an increase in emissions from previous years." The Commission of
the European Communities (Commission) rejected the plan but gave Poland an
ultimatum: consent to a decreased amount of emission allowances, in which case
the plan would be accepted, or refuse the decreased amount of emission
allowances and the plan would be rejected." The Commission's proposed amount
of emission allowances was less than seventy-five percent of what Poland had
requested.14
Poland refused the Commission's alternative; instead, Poland went to the
Court of First Instance and requested an annulment of the Commission's decision
to reject Poland's plan. '- Contrary to the expectations of commentators, the Court
agreed with Poland, finding that the "Commission exceeded its power." 6 The
Commission's attempt to place strict guidelines on carbon polluters was too
excessive for the Court, whose ruling could lead to an addition of more than 50
million tons of emission allowances plunging into the market.
The Court's ruling caused a decrease in carbon trading prices'" and has
illustrated that the Commission's power of review is much more limited than
once thought.' 9 The ruling is also a victory for Eastern European States, 20 several
of whom were considering action against the Commission themselves.
10. Id.; Amy Littlefield, Montana Revokes Permit for New Coal-Fired Power Plant, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
7, 2009, available at http://latimesblogs.1atimes.com/greenspace/2009/08/coal-power-plant-natural-gas-.html.
11. Littlefield, supra note 10.
12. MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLAN FOR CO2 EMISSION ALLOWANCES:
2005-2007 TRADING PERIOD (2004) (Pol.), available at http://www.ieta.org/ietalwww/pages/getfile.php?
doclD=992 [hereinafter POLAND'S 2005-2007 NAP]; MINISTRY OF THE ENV'T, NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLAN
FOR CO, EMISSION ALLOWANCES FOR 2008-2012 SETTLEMENT PERIOD (2006) (Pol.) [hereinafter POLAND'S
2008-2012 NAP] (on file with Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal).
13. Commission Decision of 26 Mar. 2007, Concerning the National Allocation Plan for the Allocation
of Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowances Notified by Poland in Accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council (regarding POLAND'S 2008-2012 NAP).
14. Estonia, Poland Win Back Pollution Permits in EU Court, EU BUSINESS, Sept. 23, 2009, available
at http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/climate-warming.16/; Commission Decision of 26 Mar. 2007, supra
note 13.
15. Case T-183/07, Republic of Pol. v Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 2009 WL 3011634.
16. Carl Mortished, European Carbon Trading Market Takes Hit, THE TIMES ONLINE (U.K.), Sept. 24,
2009, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/toVnews/world/europe/article6846674.ece.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Biopact Team, EU Emission Trading Scheme Faces Revolt in Eastern Europe, THE BIOPACT (Belg.),
Aug. 1, 2007, http://news.mongabay.com/bioenergy/2007/08/eu-emission-trading-scheme-faces-revolt.htmil.
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The European Union Court of First Instance's decision to limit the
Commission's power could very well be the judgment that destroys the European
Union Emission's Trading Scheme. The purpose of this comment is to discuss
the Court of First Instance's decision to limit the Commission's power, why that
decision was incorrect, the effects of that ruling on the European Union, and
potential measures to correct the European Union Emission's Trading Scheme.
Section II will provide background information on the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, the European
Union Emission's Trading Scheme, and national allocation plans. Section m will
discuss the Poland v. Commission, Court of First Instance case. Section IV will
discuss the Commission's current authority, the effects of the Court's decision,
the Commission's decision to appeal, and potential measures to correct the
European Union Emission's Trading Scheme. Finally, section V will conclude by
suggesting several actions that could be taken to ensure the integrity and survival
of the European Union Emission's Trading Scheme.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) was adopted and signed by 192 Parties.22 The UNFCCC was
established with the objective of saving the climate system by stabilizing the
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. 23 The UNFCCC was a great
step forward for climate change, but only "encouraged" nations to stabilize their
greenhouse gas emissions;24 however, that changed when the UNFCCC adopted
the Kyoto Protocol (Protocol).
B. The Kyoto Protocol
The Protocol not only encouraged stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions,
but "committed" industrialized nations to a plan of action. 25 The plan gave real
substance to the objective of the UNFCCC by establishing solid emissions
reduction targets. If the plan were implemented successfully, it would reduce
22. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Parties to the Convention and
Observer States, http://unfccc.int/parties-andobservers/parties/items/2352.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2010);
UNFCCC, Introduction to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its
Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/press/fact-sheetslitems/4978.php (last visited Apr. I1, 2010).
23. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, Jun. 20, 1992, S. TREATY Doc
No. 102-38, available at http://unfecc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
24. UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto.-protocollitems/2830.php (last visited Apr. 11,
2010) (discussing Kyoto Protocol).
25. Id.
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26
overall greenhouse gas emissions by at least five percent below 1990 levels by
201227 and would represent an overall decrease of about thirty percent of
"business as usual" emissions.28
The Protocol was adopted in 1997, after ten days of strenuous negotiations,29
at the third session of the Conference of the Parties.o During the seventh session,
the "Marrakesh Accords" established the detailed rules for implementation of the
Protocol," which has been operational since it was entered into force in 2005 .32
The Protocol established three flexible methods for the Parties to reach their
emissions obligations: emissions trading, joint implementations, and clean
development mechanisms."
At the time the Protocol was ratified, the European Union had fifteen
members. These fifteen Member States recognized that climate change was one
of the most important matters affecting modern society and agreed that action
must be taken." As a result, they committed themselves above and beyond the
emissions reduction requirements of the Protocol. The Member States agreed to
set their reduction obligations of greenhouse gas emission levels at eight percent
below 1990 levels by the 2008 to 2012 commitment period, compared to the five
percent reduction required by the Protocol. Although this commitment was
more demanding than the Protocol's requirements, it appeared to be an
achievable goal, unlike their current thirty percent reduction goal.
To accomplish the European Union's difficult task of reducing its emissions,
the Member States agreed to initiate an "efficient European market in greenhouse
gas emission allowances."" This emissions market became known as the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)."
26. Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons, perfluorocarbons,
and sulphur hexafluoride. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Annex A,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
27. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 26.
28. Brendan P. McGivern, Introduction to Kyoto Protocol, supra note 26, at n5.
29. Id.
30. Id. at n4.
31. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13 (Jan. 21,
2002).
32. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 26, art. 3, § 2.
33. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 26.
34. EUROPA, Climate Change, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/home-en.htm (last visited Apr.
11, 2010).
35. Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 1 2 (EC), [hereinafter EU ETS Directive]
(establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community).
36. Id.
37. Id., 15.
38. EUROPA, Emissions Trading System, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index
en.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
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C. European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
The EU ETS originates from Directive 2003/87/EC, 9 which established an
emissions market that allows trading of allowances amongst the European
Member States." Each allowance is the right to emit one ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent during a specified period. 41 The EU ETS is a mandatory cap-and-trade
scheme for all Member States. 42 The scheme permits Member States to trade
allowances on an open market in order to satisfy their requirements under the
Protocol.43 The scheme also establishes an automatic penalty for non-compliance
that varies depending upon which phase of the program is currently in
operation." The EU ETS operates in three phases: phase I ran from 2005 through
2007,45 phase II runs from 2008 through 2012,46 and phase III will run from 2013
to 2020.47
Phase I was a pilot program designed to work out any problems and only
allowed carbon dioxide trading. 48 The pilot program discovered one major
problem: the Commission released more allowances than there were greenhouse
gas pollutants being created by the industries. 49 The large supply of allowances
saturated the emissions trading market.so When an economic market has more
supply than demand, the end result is a collapse in market prices." In this case,
the excess supply in allowances far exceeded Member States' demand, resulting
in a collapse in market prices for emission allowances.52 The Commission
corrected this problem for phase II by drastically reducing the amount of
39. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35.
40. Id.
41. Id., art. 3(a) (defining an allowance as "an allowance to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent
during a specified period").
42. JANE ELLIS & DENNIS TIRPAK, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
Linking GHG EMISSION TRADING SYSTEMS AND MARKETS (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/data
oecd/45/35/37672298.pdf.
43. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 26, art. 17.
44. DALLAS BURTRAW, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM
FOR CALIFORNIA: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCE BOARD 16 (2007), available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/events/2007-06-12_macmeeting/
2007-06-01_MACDRAFT_REPORT.PDF.
45. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 11.
46. Id.
47. Council Directive 2009/29, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 63 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:EN:PDF.
48. Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 293, at 302 (2008).
49. Michael Lawton, EU Court Threatens Cap-and-Trade System, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Sept. 23, 2009,
available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4717782,00.html.
50. Id.
51. See INVESTOPEDIA.COM, ECONOMIC BASICS 7 (2006), http://i.investopedia. com/inv/pdf/tutoials/
economics.pdf.
52. EU Price Collapse Sparks Calls for Intervention, CARBON FINANCE (U.K.), Mar. 6, 2009, available
at http://www.carbon-financeonline.com/index.cfm?section=lead&action=view&id= 11903.
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allowances given to the Member States;" however, this route resulted in
unanticipated consequences with Poland and Estonia challenging the
Commission's authority.M
Phase 11 was designed to run simultaneously with the Kyoto Protocol and
included additional greenhouse gas emissions." Phase H also increased the
automatic penalty for non-compliance from E40 per ton to £100 per ton. The
penalty increase will likely create a strong incentive to comply because an EU
allowance is currently trading on the market for roughly 615 per ton." Even with
an expected increase in EU allowance market trading prices,-" the outlandish
penalty of E100 per ton will surely deter non-compliance.
Although the current penalty might be considered excessive, some believe
the penalty is appropriate because phase II also initiates an ability to "bank"
allowances. 9 Unlike phase I, where allowances "expired" at the end of the phase,
allowances acquired during phase II are transferrable to phase III through a
process called banking.60 A Member State may bank any surplus allowances not
used during phase II and use those allowances for phase 111.61 Commentators
believe that the ability to bank surplus allowances will result in a price increase
towards the end of phase 11.62 As Member States realize they will be short on
allowances for phase III, analysts expect to see the price per allowance reach
upwards of £100.65 They predict this outcome because companies will attempt to
build a supply of allowances after realizing they will be short for phase III.' This
thought-process suggests that the £100 penalty fee might not be high enough.
53. See e.g., Lawton, supra note 49 (discussing the Commission's ruling ordering Poland and Estonia to
submit a new a plan which would further reduce their potential emissions).
54. Id.
55. PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE & PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, CLIMATE CHANGE
101: CAP AND TRADE 7 (2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ClimatelOl-CapTrade-
Jan09.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 101: CAP AND TRADE].
56. BURTRAW, supra note 44; CLIMATE CHANGE 101: CAP AND TRADE, supra note 55; JOSEPH KRUGER
& WILLIAM A. PIZER, THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING DIREcTIVE: OPPORTUNITIES AND POTENTIAL PITFALLS,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 6 (2004), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-04-24.pdf.
57. BURTRAW, supra note 44; Laurence Peter, EU Soft on Polluters, Greens Say, BBC NEWS, July 22,
2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/8163571.stm.
58. Michael Grubb, Time to Act on Carbon Markets, BBC NEWS, Apr. 15, 2009, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilscience/nature/8000156.stm.
59. See Stephen Gardner, EU ETS: The Winners and Losers of EU Carbon Trading, CLIMATE CHANGE
CORP: CLIMATE NEWS FOR BUSINESS, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.climatechangecorp.com/content.asp?
ContentlD=5654; see also KRUGER & PIZER, supra note 56.
60. KRUGER & PIZER, supra note 56.
61. Andrzej Werkowski, Polish Banking Rules: Uncertainties Remain, EUETS.COM, Oct. 19, 2006,
http://www.euets.com/index.php?page=news&newsid=43&l= 1.
62. Gardner, supra note 59.
63. Id.
64. See id.
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Although each phase of the EU ETS differs, they all require Member States
to submit a National Allocation Plan (NAP).6 ' The NAPs for phase I were due
one year before the initiation of the phase, and phase II plans were required to be
prepared and published by June 2006."
D. National Allocation Plans
NAPs are essential to the EU ETS.67 These plans determine the amount of
emission allowances each Member State will be allocated." Member States
develop a NAP for each trading period.69 In each NAP, a Member State decides
how many allowances will be granted to industries in its country for each year of
the trading period.o The Member State also determines how many allowances
each covered entity will receive.
Upon completion of a Member State's NAP, it is submitted to the
Commission.72 The Commission then evaluates the plan to determine if it is in
compliance with the Directive.7 ' The Commission's power to review a NAP is
very limited74 and the Commission may only reject a NAP if it is determined to
be "incompatible" with Annex III or with Article 10."
The criteria set out in Annex III requires that the amount of allowances be
consistent with the Kyoto Protocol emissions target, 6 that there be no
discrimination between companies or sectors, that the plan take into
consideration comments from the public," and that the plan contain information
regarding technological potential to reduce emissions.79 Additionally, Member
States should not attempt to over-allocate allowances and should account for
economic considerations. 0
65. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 9.
66. Memorandum, Questions and Answers on Emissions Trading and National Allocation Plans for
2008 to 2012, at 2 (Nov. 29, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/m06_452_en.pdf.
67. See id. at 1.
68. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, Annex m.
69. John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 ENERGY L. J. 1, 13-
14 (2008).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 9; Dembach & Kakade, supra note 69.
73. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 9; Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 69.
74. Case T-183/07, Republic of Pol. v Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 2009 WL 3011634, 1 36.
75. Id., 36; EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 9.
76. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, Annex 11 11.
77. Id., Annex m 5.
78. Id., Annex I 9.
79. Id., Annex III 3, 8.
80. Status of the EU ETS, CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK EUROPE, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.climnet.
org/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=55&Itemid=67; Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 69; EU
ETS Directive, supra note 35, Annex H.
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The criteria set out in Article 10 requires Member States to assign a
minimum of ninety-five percent of allowances to industries at no cost during
phase I and ninety percent of allowances at no cost during phase II." The NAP
may be rejected within three months from the time notification is received;
however, if this time period lapses, the NAP "becomes definitive and enjoys a
presumption of legality which permits the Member State to put it into effect."82
The NAPs tend to create a great deal of problems and controversies. In
November 2006, the Commission evaluated the first ten NAPs for the EU ETS
phase II. In assessing the numbers, the Commission determined that, on
aggregate, the projected emissions would result in a five percent increase over
2005 levels." Although this number represented a slight decrease below
projected "business-as-usual" emission levels, the number also illustrated a
failing emissions scheme that would likely not meet the Protocol targets,
especially not the recently unveiled ambitious 30 percent reduction goal the EU
considered imposing on itself.16
The Commission had to address the discrepancies in numbers in order to
preserve the integrity of the EU ETS." First, the Commission claimed that the
NAPs were in violation of the Directive and rejected all but the United
Kingdom's allocation plan, finding them to be incompatible with the criteria
listed in Annex 111.88 Second, the Commission interpreted the Directive as
granting the Commission the power to set total emission allocations that would
be deemed acceptable." These "acceptable" levels of emissions were determined
by a simple numerical formula and applied to all NAPs. 0
The application of this formula was a drastic attempt to limit the amount of
allowances given to Member States. Two Member States, Poland and Estonia,
were especially affected by the formula's adoption and received the worst of the
Commission's decision.9' Poland's allowances were reduced by more than a
quarter and Estonia lost nearly half of its allowances.92 The radical reduction in
emissions for the two Member States will likely have a significant impact on
Poland and Estonia's economies, which are dependent on "old-fashioned coal
plants."
81. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 10.
82. Case T-183/07, Republic of Pol. v Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 2009 WL 3011634,7 41.
83. See Estonia, Poland Win Back Pollution Permits in EU Court, supra note 14.
84. CARBON TRUST, supra note 8, at 6.
85. Id. at 6.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See Estonia, Poland Win Back Pollution Permits in EU Court, supra note 14.
92. Id.
93. See Andrew Rettman, Poland Tries to Shed Image of EU Climate Villain, EUOBSERVER.COM, Dec.
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Although the Commission was forced to act in order to reach Protocol
compliance, this was likely not the correct step. 4 Since the Commission applied
the same numerical formula to all NAPs, one successful challenge to the
Commission's interpretation of the Directive could result in an opening of
"floodgates" for all Member States to appeal. 5 Germany was the first Member
State to threaten litigation against the Commission over the interpretation of the
Directive, but it eventually withdrew its threat. With Germany's withdrawal,
several other countries removed their legal challenges and it began to appear as if
the Commission had successfully changed a five percent increase over 2005
emission levels to a five percent decrease below 2005 emission levels.
However, this was not the case."
1. Poland's National Allocation Plan
The European Committee of the Polish Council of Ministers approved
Poland's NAP in June 2006."9 The plan discussed Poland's efforts to aid in the
accomplishment of the objectives and requirements of the Directive by following
an accepted methodology for preparing NAPs.'1' There are two main methods for
preparing NAPs: "sectoral" and gross domestic product (GDP).'o' Poland used
the "sectoral" method.102
Although Poland did not use the "GDP" method, it is important to explain.'0 3
This method is an analysis of the "GDP" of a Member State as a whole, and then
by each sector's'" GDP individually.o The next step is to forecast the expected
increases in GDP.'06 The current GDP and the projected increase in GDP are
used to determine emission allocations for the sectors. "
11, 2009, http://euobserver.com/885/29140.
94. See CARBON TRUST, supra note 8.
95. Id. at 6.
96. Id. at 6, 11.
97. Id.
98. Case T-183/07, Republic of Pol. v Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 2009 WL 3011634.
99. POLAND'S 2008-2012 NAP, supra note 12.
100. Id. at 8-10, 29-30.
101. See Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 55.
102. POLAND'S 2008-2012 NAP, supra note 12, at 22.
103. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 155.
104. For the duration of POLAND'S 2008-2012 NAP, the word "sector" is referring to a distinct subset of
a market/industry. For example, Poland's NAP sectors included: the utility power, combined heat and power
plants, utility heating plants, refining industry, coking industry, iron and steel industry, cement industry, lime
industry, paper industry, glass industry, ceramic industry, chemical industry, and sugar industry. POLAND'S
2008-2012 NAP, supra note 12, at 53.
105. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND WATER MANAGEMENT, ROMANIAN NATIONAL
ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE PERIODS 2007 AND 2008-2012, 9-11 available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
climat/pdf/nap-romania-final.pdf.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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The "sectoral" method consists of "defining the volume of emissions
allowances for each sector to be allocated amongst the entities maintaining the
installations.,"'0, This method, in essence, looks to the amount of emissions for
each sector over the previous years and then allocates forecasted future emissions
to those sectors pursuant to the objectives of the Directive.'" Through use of the
"sectoral" method, Poland determined that it needed 279.608285 million tons of
emissions for the period of 2008-2012."0 Poland reached this conclusion by
analyzing fourteen individual sectors and deciding the number of allowances
allocated to each sector."'
The Commission registered Poland's initial NAP in July 2006.H12 Poland and
the Commission corresponded for a few months regarding the plan and
eventually, after Poland sent additional information in order to complete the plan,
the Commission reduced the total amount of Poland's emissions by 76.132937
million tons." 3 This reduction represented a decrease of more than twenty-five
percent in emissions from what Poland had initially requested." 4
Poland refused to accept the Commission's decision to reduce emissions;
instead, Poland continued to fight for the right to emit greenhouse gas pollutants
and attempted to regain the total amount of emissions requested."' "Poland
argued that, because of its power industry's dependence on Soviet-era coal, its
NAP deserved special treatment when submitted to the Commission for
approval.""'6  The Commission thought Poland was seeking leniency and
"generous allocations" in an effort to compensate for Poland's low GDP.'"
Accordingly, the Commission "insisted that all EU Members. .. abide by
common rules and expectations.""' The Commission's lack of leniency brought
both parties to the European Union Court of First Instance."'
108. POLAND's 2008-2012 NAP, supra note 12, at 22.
109. Id. at 22-23.
110. Id. at 52.
111. Id.at52-69.
112. Commission Decision of 26 Mar. 2007, supra note 13, 1.
113. Id., 113.
114. POLAND'S 2008-2012 NAP, supra note 12; Commission Decision of 26 Mar. 2007, supra note 13.
115. Case T- 183/07, Republic of Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 2009 WL 3011634.
116. Mortished, supra note 16.
117. CARBON TRUST, supra note 8, at 11.
118. Id.
119. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00.
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m. POLAND V. COMMISSIONI 20
A. Background
Poland acquires approximately ninety-six percent of its electricity needs from
coal-burning plants, 2' an energy source that is the primary cause of climate
change due to its high level of carbon dioxide emissions.2 2 Poland estimates it
will need to purchase emission allowances by 2013 in order to meet the
obligations of the EU ETS.123  As stated above, the price on the market per
allowance is currently approximately 615;124 however, that number could jump to
E10012' by the end of phase II, right at the time Poland expects it will need to
purchase allowances.126 With Poland's future electricity costs expected to soar by
ninety percent, purchasing emissions could be extremely detrimental to Poland's
127
economy.
Poland's alternative is to purchase natural gas from Russia, a route that raises
its own set of concerns.128 One commentator said that Russia has monopolistic
control over the natural gas markets 29 because roughly one-quarter of the
European Union's natural gas is being imported from Russia.'" European fears
over winter fuel shortages continue to grow as Russia's power over the natural
gas markets becomes more apparent."' These fears over fuel shortages have
become a common part of life throughout Europe, and for good reason.13 2 In
January 2009, Russia, once again,'13 dramatically stopped all natural gas exported
120. Id.
121. Cienski & Chaffin, supra note 9; Rettman, supra note 93.
122. See Littlefield, supra note 10.
123. Cienski & Chaffin, supra note 9.
124. BURTRAW, supra note 44; Peter, supra note 57.
125. Gardner, supra note 59.
126. Cienski & Chaffin, supra note 9.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Megan K. Stack & Sebastian Rotella, Flow of Russian Natural Gas to Europe Cut, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Jan. 7, 2009, at A2.
130. Stack & Rotella, supra note 129; see Putin Seals New Turkey Gas Deal, BBC NEWS, Aug. 6, 2009,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hilbusiness/8186946.stm (commentator discusses Russia's new
pipeline deal that will flow natural gas from Russia to Europe through Turkey, a measure that will increase
Russia's control).
131. Stack & Rotella, supra note 129; see Isabel Gorst & Geoff Dyer, Pipeline Brings Asian Gas to
China, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 14, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/38fc5dl4-e8dl-l de-a756-
00144feab49a.html (commentator discusses a deal between Turkey and the European Union crumbling because
Turkey decided to sell the natural gas to China instead).
132. Stack & Rotella, supra note 129.
133. Gregory Feifer, Russia Stops Natural Gas Sales to Ukraine, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Jan. 2, 2006,
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5079105 (commentators discussing Russia
cutting off natural gas supplies to Ukraine in 2005).
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to Europe, causing natural gas shortages'" and heightening concerns across
Europe.1"
Since Poland's access to natural gas is unreliable and the cost to purchase
emission allowances will probably cause financial turmoil, its attempt to decrease
emissions in order to comply with the EU ETS will likely be seen as
unattainable.' 6 Given that Poland's situation is similar to other Member States, it
follows that the European Union as a whole might have difficulty reducing
emissions by thirty percent below 1990 levels.' With Poland unable to rely on a
guaranteed supply of natural gas and the looming concern of purchasing emission
allowances in the future, Poland was forced to submit a national allocation plan
that projected an increase in emissions from previous years.
In June 2006, Poland sent the Commission its NAP for the EU ETS phase
II.'" The plan included details regarding compliance with each of the listed
criteria set out in Annex IHl of the Directive.'4 According to the NAP, Poland
intended to annually allocate 284.648332 million tons-equivalent of carbon
dioxide to the industries covered by the Directive.14' The Commission replied in
August 2006, stating that Poland's NAP was incomplete and "not compatible"
with criteria numbers 2142 and 5143 of Annex III of the Directive;'" consequently,
the Commission requested additional information. Poland eventually complied
with the Commission's request in December 2006.145
In March 2007, the Commission officially rejected Poland's NAP, indicating
that the NAP "infringed" on several criteria listed in Annex III.146 However, the
Commission stated it would not make any further objections if Poland made
134. Stack & Rotella, supra note 129; Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Cuts Off Gas Deliveries to Ukraine,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/world/europe/02gazprom.html.
135. Stack & Rotella, supra note 129; for an alternative view, see Owen Matthews, So Long, Salad
Days, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/234060 (commentator recognizes
Russia as the largest exporter of gas, but believes its status of "energy superpower" is fading because of drying
reserves, other counties seeking alternative sources due to the unreliable flow and high costs, and investors in
natural gas reserves are unwilling to work with Russia).
136. See Leigh Phillips, Poland Attempts to Delay Europe's CO, Reduction Target, EUOBSERVER.COM,
Dec. 7, 2009, http://euobserver.com/885/291 11.
137. See id.
138. POLAND'S 2005-2007 NAP, supra note 12, at 17; POLAND'S 2008-2012 NAP, supra note 12, at 15.
139. POLAND'S 2008-2012 NAP, supra note 12, at 2.
140. Id at 8.
141. Commission Decision of 26 Mar. 2007, supra note 13,[ 3.
142. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, Annex m (criteria number 2 states in part that "[tihe total
quantity of allowances to be allocated shall be consistent with assessments of actual and projected progress
towards fulfilling the Member States' contributions to the Community's commitments . . .").
143. Id. (criteria number 5 states in part that "[tihe plan shall not discriminate between companies or
sectors in such a way as to unduly favour certain undertakings or activities. . .").
144. CaseT-183/07, Republic ofPol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 2009 WL 3011634,1 11.
145. Id., 1 13.
146. Id.,% 14; Commission Decision of 26 Mar. 2007, supra note 13.
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several amendments to the NAP. 14 7 Among the requests, the Commission
required Poland's total quantity of allowances be reduced by 76.132937 million
tons per year,48 thereby fixing Poland's maximum amount of emissions at
208.515395 million tons.14 9
B. Plea I. "[Illegal adoption of the contested decision after the expiry of the
three-month period"
Poland argued that the Commission waived its right to reject the NAP,
pursuant to Article 9(3),"s0 because the three-month time period began to run
upon the Commission's receipt of the incomplete NAP; hence, the three-month
period expired before an official rejection."' The Commission claimed that a
"reasonable" interpretation of the Directive demonstrates that the three-month
period should only begin to run upon notification of a "complete NAP."'52 Under
this reasonable interpretation, the Court should apply the three-month period to
the date the amended NAP was registered; thus, the time period for rejecting the
NAP would not have expired.'
The Court held that the three-month period to reject a NAP begins to run
regardless of whether the plan is complete or not; otherwise, a Member State
could continually postpone the Commission's decision." The Court points out
that Article 9(3) expressly states, "the starting-point of the three-month period is
the notification of the NAP" and the Commission never denied receiving
notification.' The Court clearly indicated that the Commission's three-month
period to reject Poland's NAP began to run in June 2006;16 however, the Court
established an alternative reading to the three-month time period expiring.'
The Court initially stated that when the time period expires, the NAP
"becomes definitive and enjoys a presumption of legality which permits the
Member State to put it into effect." "' However, this presumption is different from
147. Commission Decision of 26 Mar. 2007, supra note 13, art. 2 ("No objections shall be raised to the
[NAP], provided that the following amendments to the [NAP] are made in a non-discriminatory manner and
notified to the Commission as soon as possible, taking into account the time-scale necessary to carry out the
national procedures without undue delay.").
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 9(3) (stating in part: "[w]ithin three months of notification of
a national allocation plan by a Member State under paragraph 1, the Commission may reject that plan, or any
aspect thereof, on the basis that it is incompatible with the criteria listed in Annex [H or with Article 10).
151. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 27, 28, 29, 30.
152. Id., 31.
153. Id.
154. Id., T 35.
155. Id., 39.
156. Id., 37.
157. See Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, T 37.
158. Id., T 41.
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what the Court later deemed to be a presumption of authorization of the NAP.'
A presumption of authorization is a general acceptance of a NAP while a
presumption of legality only allows the Member State to implement the NAP.
The difference between the two presumptions allows the Commission to adopt a
decision to reject a NAP after the expiration period. 6 ' Thus, when the
Commission raises an objection or requests additional information regarding a
NAP, the Court considers the three-month period to be suspended until the NAP
is amended by the Member State.162 Consequently, Poland's first plea for illegal
adoption of the contested decision after the expiry of the three-month period was
dismissed.'63
C. Plea II: "Infringement of the duty to state reasons and of Article 9(1) and (3)
of the Directive"
1. Adopting and Applying a Single Method of Economic Analysis
Poland accused the Commission of violating "Community law" and
"principles[s] of cooperation" by deciding to use the "GDP method," rather than
the "sectoral method."'64 The Commission applied the "GDP method" after
giving no indication to the Member States of its plan to use this method until
October 2006.165 By this point in time, it was too late.'66 Poland had already
submitted its NAP using the "sectoral method" of economic analysis.67 Poland
stated that the Commission's failure to provide Member States with notification
for which method of economic analysis would be used in evaluating NAPs was
the direct reason for Poland applying the incorrect method and therefore the
Commission should not replace Poland's method. 6 1
In response, the Commission argued that the "GDP" method for economic
analysis is the "most accurate" and delivers the most "reliable estimates of GDP
growth and carbon intensity improvement rates;" hence, the Commission's
decision to replace Poland's "sectoral" method with the "GDP" method was
justified by concerns of accuracy and reliability.'69 The Court disagreed and
159. See id., 42
160. Id.
161. Id., 43.
162. Id., 43.
163. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 47.
164. Id., 9 55, 58.
165. Id., 55.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id., (H 55,58.
169. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 145.
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found that the Commission's argument was not sufficient justification for
replacing Poland's "sectoral" method. 7 0
The Commission then argued that the "principle of equal treatment" between
Member States should allow the Commission to apply a single method for
assessing NAPs."' If the Commission is not allowed to apply the same method to
each Member State's NAP, Member States' emission reductions would likely
vary and create an atmosphere of unfair treatment.172 Consequently, the
Commission should be granted the power to use a single method of economic
analysis. The Court disagreed with the Commission's arguments, stating:
To allow the Commission to use a single method of assessing NAPs for
all the Member States would amount to acknowledging it as having not
only a veritable power of uniformisation in the context of implementing
the allowance trading system, but also a central role in the drawing up of
NAPs. Neither such a power of uniformisation nor such a central role
were conferred on the Commission by the legislature in the Directive, in
the context of its power of reviewing NAPs.13
2. Fixing a Ceiling for Emission Allowances
Poland next accused the Commission of violating Article 9(3) of the
Directive by setting a ceiling for the total quantity of allowances Poland could
allocate. 7 4 Poland believed that the Commission exceeded its power of review by
fixing a ceiling and essentially replacing Poland's NAP.'7 The Commission
claimed that it did not replace the NAP but instead established a "maximum level
for the total quantity of allowances to be allocated."' The Commission then
attempted to justify the fixed limit on Poland's quantity of allowances by
providing examples of other Member States' NAPs that were not rejected.'7 7
However, the examples only demonstrated that other Member States accepted the
Commission's forced reduction of allowances, not that the reductions were
authorized by the Directive. 7 1
The United Kingdom and Ireland, as amici, also stated that for an assessment
of a NAP to be accurate and correct, it must take into consideration the
potentially negative effects of an excess supply.' The Commission found an
170. Id., 103.
171. Id., 65.
172. Id.
173. Id., 106.
174. Id., (H 70, 99.
175. See Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 121.
176. Id., 122.
177. Id., 66.
178. See id., 66.
179. Id., 164.
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excess in supply within Poland's NAP. 80 Based on this finding, the Commission
contended that it had the power to reduce a NAP's emissions in order to protect
the Member States and the carbon market from the risk of a collapse in the
market, similar to what happened during phase .8
The Commission also contended that Poland's NAP was not in compliance
with the Directive.182 The Commission acknowledged that it reduced Poland's
NAP by 76.132937 million tons, but only after performing an analysis of
Poland's NAP pursuant to criteria listed in Annex Ell of the Directive.'8 ' First, the
Commission confirmed Poland's actual emissions for 2005; second, the
Commission forecasted Poland's GDP growth for 2010; and, finally, the
Commission analyzed the carbon intensity trends from 2005 to 2010.'4 Based on
this analysis, the Commission concluded that Poland's NAP was in violation of
the Directive and was therefore justified in reducing its emissions."'
The Court disagreed with the Commission's arguments that it was not
replacing Poland's NAP by fixing a ceiling for emissions.'16 Although the
Commission has the authority to review and reject a NAP,'17 only a Member State
has the power to decide the total quantity of allowances it will allocate.'18 The
Court noted that prior case law" has clearly established that only the Member
States may decide the total quantity of allowances to allocate.'" Therefore, the
Court held the "Commission exceeded the powers conferred upon it" by fixing a
ceiling for Poland's emissions.'9'
3. Replacing Data in National Allocation Plans
Poland next argued that the Commission violated Article 9(1) by substituting
Poland's data with the Commission's own data "without relevant reasoning" and
by using an "incoherent application of its own method of economic analysis,"
thereby finding Poland's data to be erroneous. 92 Poland also accused the
180. See Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 64.
181. Id.
182. Id., 962.
183. Id., 7 62-63.
184. Id., 163.
185. See id., 14.
186. Id., 9 123, 125, 131.
187. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, T 124.
188. Id., 9H 126, 131.
189. Case C-503/07, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v. Comn'n, 2008 E.C.R. 1-2217, 2008 WL
1720518.
190. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 126.
191. Id., 123.
192. Id., Z 48, 54.
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Commission of basing its conclusion only on the fact that the projected emissions
stated in the plan were greater than emissions from previous years.'
Poland stated that the Commission was not authorized to replace its data in
the NAP.194 Poland argued that the Commission had an "erroneous and
unjustified interpretation ... of its role in the process of assessing NAPs."'"
Poland indicated that Annex I1I of the Directive 96 gave Member States the power
to create their own method for economic analysis using data collected by that
Member State.' The Member State could then use the compiled data for
allocating allowances to the economic sectors.'" Poland argued that the
Commission should have independently assessed each individual sector using the
same data Poland used in preparing its NAP.'" Essentially, Poland argued that
the Commission may only review and scrutinize data supplied by the Member
State; thus, the Commission had no right "to replace the data in that Member
State's NAP with its own data" for the purpose of analyzing the economic
method established by the Member State.200
In response, the Commission argued that the data it used in reviewing
Poland's NAP was within its power derived from the Directive because data
assessment was a form of review and the Commission has been granted the
power of review.0 ' Poland claimed that the substitution of its data was in
violation of the Commission's power and that the Commission should not be
72
allowed to change a NAP's data at its discretion. The Court agreed with
Poland, finding the Commission "misjudged the extent of its powers as defined
in the Directive." 203
The Court did recognize prior case law204 granting the Commission the power
of "discretion" when carrying out "complex economic and ecological
assessments . .. ."2' The Court stated that the Commission could develop its own
193. Id., 1 49; Commission Decision of 26 Mar. 2007, supra note 13 (stating that in 2005, Poland had
verified emissions of about 203 million tons, but Poland's NAP for phase II requested about 76 million
additional tons).
194. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 54.
195. Id., 52.
196. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, Annex m ("Quantities of allowances to be allocated shall be
consistent with the potential, including the technological potential, of activities covered by this scheme to
reduce emissions. Member States may base their distribution of allowances on average emissions of greenhouse
gases by product in each activity and achievable progress in each activity.").
197. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 51.
198. Id.
199. Id.,(H50-51.
200. Id., 54.
201. Id., 77.
202. Id., 78.
203. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 100.
204. Id., 89 (citing Case T-374/04, F.R.G. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-4431, 2007 WL 3274223).
205. Id., 89, 102; see F.R.G. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-4431, 2. But see Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009
E.C.R. 00, 103.
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method of assessing NAPs based on data that it collected.' The Commission
may then use the results from its method to compare the data contained in the
Member State's NAP.2m It appears that, with this power of discretion, the
Commission may create a method that requires "complex economic and
ecological assessments" and that method could not be "challenged unless it
would lead to a manifest error of assessment."20 However, the Court noted that
this method cannot be used to set aside the Member State's own data.2" Although
the Commission is granted the power to review the "choice of data" selected by
the Member State,210 the Commission may not "set aside the data in the NAP in
question so as to replace them at the outset by data obtained from its own
assessment method." 21' Therefore, it appears that the Commission's power is
limited to creating a method for comparison purposes, but not applying that
method to all NAPs.2 2
The Commission next questioned the accuracy of the data provided by
Poland 2 " and argued that Annex III and Article 10 of the Directive required use
of the "most objective and reliable data . . .. Poland contested that some of the
data had been used in a report to the UNFCCC that was previously examined and
approved by the Commission." Nevertheless, the Commission indicated that this
fact did not give automatic "recognition" to the data.
Poland argued that the Commission failed to provide any proof that the data
supplied by Poland was not reliable or incorrect under the circumstances, and
that the Commission was required to make a "complete argument" explaining
how the data violated the Directive.217 The Court agreed, finding that the
Commission did not identify any of the "less reliable" data in Poland's NAP 2 18
and failed to give any justification for why the data in the NAP was not
reliable. 2 19 The Court also rejected the Commission's claim that the data in
Poland's NAP was overestimated,220 finding the Commission's only reasoning
and basis for the allegation being that the contested NAP's allowances were
higher than Poland's last trading period NAP. 22' The Court found the
206. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 7 102.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id., 103.
210. Id., 101.
211. Id., 103.
212. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 102-03.
213. Id., 9 68-69.
214. Id., 65.
215. Id., 68.
216. Id.
217. Id., U 50, 52.
218. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 146-48.
219. Id., 145.
220. Id., 146.
221. See id., IT 144-46.
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Commission's decision to replace Poland's NAP was based on a mere
"hypothesis" and therefore incorrect. 222
The Court concluded that the Commission's decision to replace Poland's
method for economic analysis and the data Poland used in its NAP was without
justification.23 The Court noted that Member States have "manoeuver" 224 in
developing their NAPs and the Commission may not interrupt with speculative
allegations that lack sufficient reasoning.225 In sum, the Court of First Instance
ruled that the Commission's decision, regarding Poland's NAP for the period
2008 to 2012, should be annulled.226
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Current Authority of the Commission
The Court of First Instance acknowledged Poland's allegation that the
Commission had breached the "essential rules" of the Directive. 227 The Court
stated that the Commission's power is "severely limited, both in substantive
terms and in time." 228 The Directive gave the Commission the power to "review
21
and reject NAPs," but not to fix a ceiling for emissions.229 Inferring such a power
is in violation of the Directive because Article 9 indicates that the Commission
may reject a plan "on the basis that it is incompatible with the criteria listed in
Annex III or with Article 10."230 The Court also stated that "a Member State alone
has the power ... to draw up the NAP" and to fix the total quantity of allowances
it will distribute.23'
Additionally, if the Commission rejects a NAP, it is required to give firm
reasoning for that rejection.232 For example, rejecting Poland's NAP on the basis
that there were "doubts" as to the reliability of Poland's data was not sufficient
reasoning to justify a rejection.233 Since the Commission is required to give firm
222. Id., 146.
223. Id., 153.
224. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 1 153 ("Manoeuver," as the Court uses the word, is implied to
mean discretion.).
225. Id.
226. Id., Ruling Section, 11.
227. Id., 73.
228. Id., 136.
229. Id., 9 89.
230. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 9(3).
231. Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgments of the Court of First Instance in
Case T-183/07 and in Case T-263/07 (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_52446/
[hereinafter Press Release, Judgments of the Court of First Instance].
232. Id.
233. Press Release, Judgments of the Court of First Instance, supra note 231; see Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009
E.C.R. 00, J 90 ("[T]he Commission must be regarded as entitled , when assessing an [sic] NAP, to make
specific criticisms as to incompatibilities found . . . .").
176
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 23
reasoning for any rejection, it may not secretly set a fixed ceiling and
continuously reject a NAP until that Member State's emissions are below the
unknown ceiling.2 Essentially, the Commission will no longer be allowed to set
a fixed ceiling or make suggestions on a set amount of emission allocations.
The Court also limited the Commission's power in the NAP process. The
Commission may not change or alter the Member States' data that is used in
assessing its final emission allocations. The Court also indicated that the
Commission cannot choose a single method for economic analysis because such
a decision was reserved for each Member State. 235 Allowing the Commission to
choose a single method for economic analysis would exceed the authority
conferred upon it by the Directive, and would give the Commission a power of
"uniformisation" and a "central role," both of which were not granted to the
Commission by the Directive.236
B. The Effects of the Court of First Instance's Decision
The Court of First Instance's decision sent shockwaves throughout Europe.
On the day of the decision, market emission prices declined four percent in value.
One carbon trader stated the "decision was 'totally unexpected' and 'defies
belief' ahead of United Nations-led climate talks set to take place in Copenhagen,
Denmark in December." 237
Although the Court's ruling was initially considered the downfall of the EU
ETS, these early "end of the world" debates could be premature. Market emission
prices increased by almost fourteen percent in the month following the ruling.238
This implies that the EU ETS has endured the Court's ruling and will survive.
Emission market traders have stated that the "initial fears about a re-assessment
of Poland and Estonia's carbon allocations were overblown, and it was not
certain that the outcome of the court's ruling would the [sic] lead the
[Commission] to issue new [emission allowances]."239
However, other market traders are still worried about the potential impacts of
the Court's decision on the EU ETS. 240 They believe that the Commission is
required, by the Court's ruling, to give Poland an additional 76.132937 million
tons of allowances. 24' According to the market analysts and emission traders,
234. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 9(3).
235. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 105-06.
236. Press Release, Judgments of the Court of First Instance, supra note 231.
237. Carbon Prices Fall Following Bearish Dance with Underlying Energy Complex, Court Ruling,
RENEWABLE ENERGY REPORT, Oct. 5, 2009, Issue 189, available at 2009 WLNR 20651232 [hereinafter
Bearish Dance].
238. EU Carbon Prices Rebound in October Thanks to Economic, Allowances News, RENEWABLE
ENERGY REPORT, Nov. 2, 2009, Issue 191, available at 2009 WLNR 23051035.
239. Id.
240. Bearish Dance, supra note 237.
241. Id; Commission Decision of 26 Mar. 2007, supra note 13,1 1.
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these allowances would hit the market in mid-2010. 24 2 If true, the market would
be flooded with excess emission allowances and would likely crash due to an
over-supply.2 43 The outcome of a market crash would be similar to the result in
phase I, which was exactly what the Commission was attempting to avoid. While
there are apparent negative consequences to a market crash, a positive effect of
the crash would be a rise in emissions compliance. Industries would be more
likely to comply with emission guidelines because the cost per allowance on the
market would probably be lower than the 100 penalty for non-compliance.
However, the Poland v. Commission decision only hurts the efforts of the
Commission to reduce the European Union's emissions, and comes at a time
when people were beginning to believe the emissions trading scheme might
work.244 In 2009, there were positive signs that the emissions trading scheme was
operating with success. 245 Emissions among the industries covered 2" dropped
between four percent and six percent during 2008.2' The Court's ruling disrupts
the Commission's ability to combat climate change and casts doubt in the minds
of those who were beginning to believe in the program's success.248
C. The Commission's Decision to Appeal
Several commentators appear comforted by the Commission's decision to
appeal the case, possibly because they believe the Court of First Instance's
holding will never stand. 249 The Commission's appeal claims that the Court of
First Instance erroneously interpreted the Directive by limiting the Commission's
powers in the NAP assessment process.250 The Commission believes that the
Court of First Instance read the Directive too narrowly and that the Court failed
242. Bearish Dance, supra note 237.
243. Id.
244. James Kanter, E. U. Carbon Trading System Shows Signs of Working, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/business/global/02climate.html.
245. See UNFCCC, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990-2007, supra note 7;
Alexandra Galin, The European Emissions Trading Scheme is Now a Success, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 17,
2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/17/carbon-emissions-trading-reduction-
markets.
246. Industries covered pursuant to Annex I of the Directive include: energy activities, production and
processing of ferrous metals, mineral industry, and a few other activities.
247. Kanter, supra note 244.
248. Mortished, supra note 16; Court Ruling Threatens EU Emissions Plan, CLEAN SKIES NEWS, Sept.
23, 2009, http://www.cleanskies.com/articles/court-ruling-threatens-eu-emissions-plan.
249. See Pete Harrison, EU Appeals Ruling on Poland, Estonia Carbon Quotas, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSGEE5B21 BO.
250. Press Release, Commission Appeals Against Rulings in Polish and Estonian National Allocation
Plan Cases (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/nap-appeals.pdf
[hereinafter Press Release, Commission Appeals]; Press Release, Questions and Answers in relation to the
Commission's decision to appeal in Cases T-183/07 and T-263/07 (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://ec.
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to take into account the fundamental purpose of the EU ETS: reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions.2' The Commission also claims that equal treatment of
Member States during the NAP assessment process is an essential part of the EU
ETS and that the Court should have given more weight to this consideration
rather than implying that equal treatment was an inconsequential aspect."2
The Commission's decision to appeal the case does not immediately resolve
the current issues with the EU ETS, and an appeal does not automatically
guarantee that the Court of First Instance's decision will be overruled.
D. Potential Measures to Correct the EU ETS
1. The Method for Economic Analysis
The Commission argued that all Member States must receive equal treatment
with regards to assessing NAPs.25 3 It suggested that all NAPs should be assessed
under the same method of economic analysis, but the Court held that the
Commission cannot use a single method of assessing NAPs.254 The Court claimed
that granting the Commission the power to implement a uniform NAP
assessment process and the power to have a "central role in the drawing up of
NAPs" would go beyond the legislative intent of the Directive.255
This author believes the Court of First Instance was incorrect in this ruling.
The Court stated that Member States "unequivocally" have the power to draw up
a NAP and have maneuver in choosing the method used to accomplish the goals
of the Directive; 256 however, this was an incorrect reading of the Directive. The
Directive does not "unequivocally" give Member States the power to choose
which method of economic analysis to apply in assessing it's data. The sections
referred to by the Court merely indicate that Member States shall decide the
"total quantity of allowances it will allocate" and divide up those allowances
amongst the installations.
The Court should interpret the intent of the Directive and the Commission's
power more broadly. Article 14 of the Directive gives the Commission the power
to "adopt guidelines for monitoring and reporting of emissions." 258 Article 22 of
the Directive grants the Commission the power to amend Annex 111.259 Article 24
251. Press Release, Commission Appeals, supra note 250; Press Release, Questions and Answers, supra
note 250.
252. Press Release, Commission Appeals, supra note 250; Press Release, Questions and Answers, supra
note 250.
253. Case T- 183/07, Republic of Pol. v Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 2009 WL 3011634, 1 57.
254. Id., 106.
255. Id.
256. Id., IN 85, 88.
257. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, arts. 11(2), 9(1).
258. Id., art. 14.
259. Id., art. 22 (noting, however, that the Commission may not amend Annex B criteria (1), (5) and (7)
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states that the Commission "may on its own initiative ... adopt monitoring and
reporting guidelines for emissions." 26 These articles, along with several more,
infer that the Commission has more power than what the Court found. The
Commission should have the power to adopt a method for economic analysis and
apply that method to all Member States.
Allocating more power to the Commission will not breach the separation of
powers established in the Directive.26' The Court stated that giving the
Commission a central role in drawing up NAPs was not a power derived from the
Directive. This "central role" power would not amount to a breach of the
separation of powers because Member States would still decide the total quantity
of allowances it will allocate, a power specifically granted to Member States by
Article 11(2) of the Directive. 263 However, as mentioned above, there are several
Articles in the Directive that imply a power to give guidance in completing NAPs
and consequently a power to select a single method of analysis.
The Court states that the act of fixing a ceiling for allowances was a breach
of the separation of powers.2 Conversely, the act of selecting a single method is
entirely different than fixing a ceiling for allowances. A single method of
analysis would give Member States guidance towards the accomplishment of the
Directive's goals whereas fixing a ceiling is an act of complete control.
The Court also stated that it was "not for the Commission, by virtue of the
principle of equal treatment between Member States, to select and apply a single
method for assessing the NAPs." The Court's rationale here is incorrect. By
allowing the Commission to choose and apply one method for economic analysis,
the Member States will receive equal treatment by virtue of having every NAP
drawn up in a uniform manner. Member States would still develop their own
NAPs, stating the total quantity of allowances and how they propose to allocate
those allowances. However, Member States would be required to prepare the data
they collected in accordance with the method for economic analysis that was
chosen by the Commission.
Although the adoption of a single method for economic analysis might not
take into consideration the specific needs and concerns of each individual
Member State, increasing the Commission's power to choose a single method is
critical to the progression of the EU ETS. Without this power, the EU ETS might
easily crumble and become an ineffective means for conquering climate change.
By giving the Member States the power of maneuver, the Court has essentially
granted Member States the ability to cheat the system. Member States may now
choose their own method for economic analysis; with this power, each Member
for the period from 2008 to 2012).
260. Id., art. 24(3).
261. See id., arts. 9, 11.
262. Case T-183/07, Republic of Pol. v Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 2009 WL 3011634, 1 106.
263. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 11(2).
264. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, $ 129.
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State will probably perform both analyses and then select the method that
allocates the most allowances to them. Not only is this outcome not in the best
interest of the Directive, but it is contrary to its intent, it conflicts with the
legislative goals of decreasing emissions, and it is not supported by the powers
granted to the Commission within the Directive itself; therefore, the
Commission's power must be expanded.
2. The Commission's Power to Fix Emissions
One commentator stated that "the Commission needs the right to propose
numbers in NAP negotiations with national governments, not just the right to
reject or approve the country's own suggestions. Otherwise, it cannot safeguard
the ultimate point of emissions trading - cutting emissions - or make sure all
member states contribute to this goal."265 Although this author agrees, there are
several considerations in determining whether the Commission should be granted
the power to fix a ceiling for a Member State's emissions.
The Commission attempted to argue that, if they could not fix a ceiling for
the amount of emission allowances to be allocated, there would be a serious risk
of collapse in the emissions trading market.266 The Court failed to alleviate the
concerns of a market crash when it responded that the Commission's argument
could not "justify maintaining the contested decision in force" because that
action would "breach [] the distribution of powers between the Member States
and the Commission." 267 The intent of the legislature appears to be in
268
agreement.
Although giving the Commission the power to set an emissions ceiling would
be a breach of the separation of powers, the EU ETS needs some type of "bite."
If the Commission had not violated the Directive by reducing Member States'
emissions, the EU ETS would have seen a five percent increase over 2005
emission levels.269 The European Union would become a laughingstock, having
drastically failed to meet the Protocol's requirements of eight percent below 1990
levels. With the European Union increasing the emission levels required by the
Protocol from five percent to eight percent, and then its recent discussions at
Copenhagen to increase to thirty percent below 1990 levels, a failure to reach
specified levels would not help the European Union's reputation.
By giving the Commission the power to fix a ceiling for emissions, the
Commission would effectively control the entire NAP process. This was clearly
not the intent of the legislature because the Directive states, "Member States shall
265. Isabel Save, Commission Confirms Legal Battle Over NAPs, ICIS CHEM. Bus., Dec. 14, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 25250245.
266. Pol. v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 00, 1 129.
267. Id.
268. See EU ETS Directive, supra note 35.
269. See EU ETS Directive, supra note 35; CARBON TRUST, supra note 8.
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decide upon the total quantity of allowances it will allocate."2 70 Nevertheless, the
Directive also says the emissions scheme should "promote reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient
manner.""' Additionally, the Directive indicates that the scheme should create
"an efficient European market in greenhouse gas emission allowances, with the
least possible diminution of economic development and employment." 272 Giving
the Commission complete control over the NAP process would likely result in a
successful emissions scheme, but at the cost of large economic diminution for
Member States.
Poland's attempt to comply with the emission reduction requirements would
likely result in carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs when companies and
industries relocate to other countries in order to avoid paying excessive costs to
pollute.273 Poland would not be able to alleviate the carbon leakage because its
distribution of emission allowances would be limited to what the Commission
approved.
Worst of all, the Commission released a report in December 2009, which
determined "mining and agglomeration of hard coal"-a large industry in
Poland-is "exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage."274 Therefore, Poland
could be hit hard if the Commission were granted the power to fix emission
ceilings. Poland's industries would be faced with the dilemma of moving out of
the country, paying excessive costs for allowances on the market, or receiving
severe fines for lack of compliance. Generally, it is economically sensible to take
the first option and move out of the county. That is why carbon leakage is
275
considered one of the leading fears of cap-and-trade systems and is another
valid reason for limiting the Commission's power to fix a ceiling for Member
States' emissions.
Beyond the concerns of carbon leakage is Poland's inability to comply with
such a low emissions ceiling. As one commentator stated, "coal is king in
Poland." 276 With an estimated 140 years' worth of coal reserves and ninety-six
percent of Poland's electricity being coal-powered, the commentator's statement
277
appears to be a correct representation of Poland's situation. Because coal is one
270. EU ETS Directive, supra note 35, art. 11(2).
271. Id., art. I (emphasis added).
272. Id., 5 (emphasis added).
273. Danny Fortson, Chemicals Boss Warns of Exodus, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 7, 2008, available
at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry-sectors/industrials/article5299219.ece.
274. Council Directive 2010/2, Annex, 2010 O.J. (L 001) (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:001:0010:0018:EN:PDF (including a list of sectors and subsectors
which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage).
275. Brooks V. Rice, The "Triumph" of the Commons: An Analysis of Enforcement Problems and
Solutions in the Western Climate Initiative, 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 401,417 (2010).
276. Coal-fired Poland in Fighting Mood Over EU Emissions Rules, ENERGY DAILY, Jan. 21, 2008,
httpJ/www.energy-daily.conreports/Coal-firedPoland-in-fighting-mood-overEUemissionsrules_999.html.
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of the highest polluting sources for power in the world,278 the Commission's
drastic reduction in emissions would likely force Poland to seek an alternative
power supply. Poland's alternative, as discussed above, is to acquire natural gas
from Russia. An agreement to import natural gas from Russia would be
accompanied by uncertainties with the flow of supply and price.
The Commission urged the Court to consider the "equal treatment" of
Member States. In order to reach the goal of decreasing emissions pursuant to the
Protocol, all Member States should have to contribute. Without giving the
Commission more hands-on power to develop a single method for economic
analysis or allowing the Commission to fix a ceiling for emissions, the Member
States who are not "in the mood" to contribute to the Protocol's goals would not
be required to do anything. When a Member State fails to reduce emissions,
regardless of whether the decision is based on a Member State not being "in the
mood" or if the decision is legitimately forced by economic considerations, the
rest of the Member States would be required to pick up the slack.
There is an apparent fundamental unfairness surrounding the lack of equal
treatment. For example, a report that was released by the UNFCCC in October
2009 revealed the total aggregate emissions for the years 1990, 2000, and 2005 to
2007, for each Member State.279 The report showed that Poland's 2007 emission
levels were thirty percent below its 1990 levels while Spain's emission levels
were 53.5 percent above its 1990 levels.28 0 The report also indicated that the
European Union Member States, as a whole, were only 4.3 percent below their
1990 levels. 281' This information correlates with the fact that Spain's phase II
NAP, for the period 2008-2012, was reduced by the Commission a mere 0.003
percent for an emissions total of 152.3 million tons.282
The UNFCCC report illustrates an unfair system that is in desperate need of a
change. There are several Member States who have dramatically cut back on
emission levels while many more have increased their emission levels. Member
States, like Poland, are forced to cut emissions at the cost of economic
diminution in order to help the European Union, as a whole, reach a reduced
aggregated level of emissions. Nevertheless, the reduced level of emissions might
not even be attainable for the European Union.
The integrity of the EU ETS is dependent upon a system that will require
Member States to reduce emission levels. It is clear that the Commission needs
some type of "bite" in order to ensure a proper emissions reducing scheme.
However, it is difficult to determine what that "bite" should be, but it is certain
278. See Littlefield, supra note 10.
279. UNFCCC, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990-2007, supra note 7.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Commission Decision of 26 Feb. 26, 2007, Concerning the National Allocation Plan for the
allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowances Notified by Spain in Accordance with Directive
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
climat/pdf/nap-spain-decisionsen.pdf (regarding Spain's NAP for 2008-2012).
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that the concerns of carbon leakage 'and fundamental fairness of equal treatment
must be taken into consideration.
This author believes the Commission should not be granted the authority to
fix a ceiling for emissions. This authority would give the Commission too much
power and create a high potential for economic diminution amongst the Member
States. Additionally, it is doubtful that any Member State would willingly
concede absolute control to the Commission and allow it to determine ceilings
for emissions, regardless of each Member States' individual economy. With that
said, a lesser degree of control would be an encouraging alternative to complete
control over fixing emissions. A potentially acceptable degree of control could be
the power to reduce a NAP's emissions combined with several limitations on that
power.
The Directive currently requires the Commission to give reasons for rejecting
a NAP, but this is not enough. The Commission should be required to give an in-
depth analysis for why the current emission levels are not within the objectives of
the Directive and the Commission's reasoning should be justified through an
analysis of the Member State's own data. The Commission's analysis and
reasoning should be reviewed under a type of strict scrutiny. The Commission
should only be allowed to reduce a Member State's emissions if the reduction is
deemed entirely necessary and there are no other reasonable alternatives. This
scrutiny might help control the Commission's power but still afford the
Commission a means to accomplish the Directive's goals.
3. The Three-Month Rule
The three-month rule needs to be clarified. The Directive should be amended
to account for the Court's differentiating rules between the presumption of
legality and presumption of authorization. It was clear that Poland was never
going to win this plea; otherwise, Member States could continuously give the
Commission incomplete NAPs with the hope that the time period would expire,
thus ensuring the validity of the Member State's NAP. Although the outcome
was predictable, the Court still found a way of complicating the rule.
The Court determined that a presumption of legality permits the Member
State to place the NAP into effect and a presumption of authorization is a general
acceptance of the NAP's validity. While the two rules are rather simple to
understand, there is no need to apply both in the context of the three-month rule.
The Directive should be amended to indicate only one three-month rule: the
presumption of authorization. The presumption of legality should automatically
apply when the old NAP expires. A Member State's NAP should not become
effective until the next trading period begins. This will reduce confusion and
ensure that the three-month period only applies to the presumption of
authorization.
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V. CONCLUSION
Member States of the European Union need to revisit the Directive to
accommodate for the recent developments brought to light in the Court of First
Instance's ruling. First, Member States should amend the Directive to give the
Commission the power to select a single method for economic analysis and apply
that method to all Member States. This will ensure equal treatment of all Member
States and the positive progression of the EU ETS. Second, Member States
should amend the Directive to give the Commission more power when rejecting a
national allocation plan. The Commission should not be authorized to fix a
ceiling for emission allowances; however, the Commission should be granted the
power to reduce a national allocation plan's emissions so long as it is reasonably
justified through an analysis of the Member State's own data and in accordance
with the objectives of the Directive. Third, the Member States should amend the
Directive in order to clarify the three-month rule and approve only the
presumption of authorization rule established by the Court of First Instance. This
author believes that these three amendments will help ensure the integrity of the
EU ETS by balancing the need for equal treatment between the Member States,
the need to guarantee the separation of powers, and the need to reduce emissions.
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